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Poland and Hungary are EU Member States where the rule of law is not
safeguarded, and there is concern that more states could soon follow. Meanwhile,
the Union’s position seems to be relatively weak in relation to rule of law backsliding
in its constituent parts: new soft law of questionable quality has been produced
by each of the EU Institutions, while positive change is nowhere in sight. This is
notwithstanding even the belated activation of the Article 7(1) of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU) mechanism against Poland and the recent move against
Hungary, following the Sargentini Report. The situation seems to be evolving
extremely fast and only in the direction of the deterioration of the rule of law in
the Member States concerned. Making matters worse, there seems to be a total
disagreement among essentially all the actors involved concerning what should be
done. The political will to sort out the current impasse appears to be lacking also at
the level of the Member States, resulting in toxic inaction and an absolute lack of
leadership. This helps the autocrats in the backsliding Member States to consolidate
their assault upon EU’s values even further.
A previously unimaginable situation has arisen, whereby the EU – a block created
to ensure democracy and peace in Europe – now harbours Member States which,
besides obviously not qualifying for Union membership if they were to apply today,
work hard to undermine precisely the founding principles enshrined in Article 2 TEU,
that the EU was created to safeguard and promote. Reinforced by EU funds and the
membership of the internal market, Hungary and Poland threw both their weights
behind undermining democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental
rights in Europe. All the dynamism of the on-going deterioration of the rule of law
notwithstanding, as it turns out the autocrats are not highly innovative. Which tools
do they use to deny all the values that the other Member States believe in and are
built upon?
There is truth in the old maxim proclaiming the imperative to try to get to know your
enemies well. We outline four key techniques deployed by the autocratic regimes in
Poland and Hungary in order to consolidate the constitutional capture and massive
assault on European values. The list of tools deployed by both governments to
achieve, legitimise, and consolidate the destruction of the rule of law includes four
interconnected elements:
1. Appeals to national sovereignty;
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2. Fetishisation of ‘constitutional identity’ taken out of context (i.e. the denial
of constitutionalism as such through claiming abuse of power to be part of
‘identity’);
3. Pleas to national security complete with the harassment of the media, NGOs,
and independent educational institutions; and, last but not least;
4. International disinformation campaigns.
Each of the four elements outlined comes with a whole stock of know-how, which the
autocrats eagerly deploy, perfect, and also share among themselves. Let us look at
some of the elements of each of the four.
Because we said so
The invocation of national sovereignty often happens without any further justification.
Polish capture of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court, the National
Council of the Judiciary, and ordinary courts happened under the pretext that a so-
called ‘reform’ of the judiciary was a matter for the Member States and the EU had
no powers to interfere.
Another example from the same jurisdiction is the dispute related to the felling
of trees in the Bia#owie#a Forest, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Pending the
judgment in the main proceedings, the Court of Justice ordered Poland to stop
logging. The Polish response was an intensified logging of trees, and Poland even
asked for removing the forest from the UNESCO World Heritage List. Reference to
national sovereignty came without any convincing justification.
Tautological self-identity
A somewhat more sophisticated variation of the above ‘because we said so’
technique is the attempt to hide departures from the rule of law behind the veil of
constitutional identity. It is of course a distorted understanding of constitutional
identity, or even an abuse of the concept.
The Hungarian example is illustrative. When delivering its abstract constitutional
interpretation in relation to European Council decision 2015/1601 on supporting
Italy and Greece in the refugee crisis, the Hungarian Constitutional Court invoked
constitutional identity. However tautological this may sound, according to the
court, ‘constitutional identity equals the constitutional (self-)identity of Hungary’. Its
content is to be determined on a case-by-case basis based on the interpretation
of the constitution, its preamble, and the achievements of the Hungarian historical
constitution. This definition is so vague that it can be considered as an attempt to
grant a carte blanche type of derogation to the executive and the legislative from
Hungary’s obligations under EU law. In 2018 the concept of constitutional identity
was even embedded in the Hungarian constitution.
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Foreign agents
The neo-McCarthyist labelling of virtually anyone still capable of formulating dissent
as foreign agents is a technique long used, but in Hungary it was taken to a whole
new level with the adoption of Lex CEU and Lex NGO, targeting a private university
and foreign-funded civil society organisations that are independent of government
funds and thereby fit to express government criticism. The explanations of the laws
attempting to force the Central European University out of Hungary and to limit
public space for NGOs respectively attempt to delegitimise these entities by claiming
they pose national security threats to the country.
The security-infused moves demonstrate that the preservation of autocracy is more
valuable in the eyes of the executive powers than not harming the key sectors of
the national knowledge-economy. In the case of Lex CEU no further explanations
were given as to how a leading academic entity could possibly be a threat to
national sovereignty, while in the case of Lex NGO, a populist rhetoric was invoked,
interlinking NGOs helping asylum seekers and the image of asylum seekers as
potential terrorists.
Deception
The fourth technique the autocrats use to undermine the rule of law is disinformation
or misinterpretation of the laws and policies of the government. Again Hungary took
the lead in 2011 when they sent a wrong translation to Brussels of their controversial
new constitution, the Fundamental Law, which looked more in conformity with EU
laws and values than the actual text. The Polish and Hungarian responses to EU
institutions invitation for a determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by these
two Member States of values enshrined in the founding EU Treaties also contain
factual mistakes and deliberate deceit.
The very fact that we are now concerned with enforcing values seriously, amounts to
nothing else but a concession that the presumption that there is a level playing field
amongst all Member States in terms of the rule of law and other values – i.e. the fact
that all of them actually adhere to the specific type of constitutionalism the EU set
out to promote – does not hold (any more).
Belarusisation from the inside
It is vital to realize, in this context, that in a situation where the core values are not
respected by an EU Member State, we are not dealing with a country that is revolting
for one reason or another against a binding norm of European law. Rather, we are
dealing with a qualitatively different phenomenon: the Belarusisation of the EU from
within.
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The core question is how to ensure that the EU’s own approach to the rule of law
does not undermine, if not destroy, adherence to the principle of the rule of law in
the Member States, which are, in fact, compliant with the values listed in Article 2
TEU. The discussion should focus in addition to the enforcement of the rule of law
– whether by democratically elected or political institutions, or the judiciary, but also
on the reform of the Union as a long-term solution. There is time, even while illiberal
regimes seem to be there to stay, and the options regarding changing this reality,
either supranationally or from a grass-roots level, are limited, if not non-existent.
In the meantime, EU institutions should come to a more subtle realisation of the
EU’s constitutional role and should not insist on the specificities of EU law trumping
all other considerations, including respect for the values the EU and the Member
States are supposed to share, but should instead acknowledge the possibility of
potential limitations so as to let the foundations of the EU, as provided for by the
Lisbon Treaty, evolve.
This implies, inter alia, eventual substantive limitations on the acquis of the Union
as well as taking Article 2 TEU values to heart in the context of the day-to-day
functioning of the Union, elevating these above the instrumentalism marking them
today. The result would be an emergence of a supranational constitutional system
at the EU level, which would be truer to the glorious ‘constitutional’ label, and which
would play a significantly more productive role in solving the backsliding challenges
in the Member States, where the war against all what we believe in is currently
waged.
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